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ARGUMENT
For purposes of this Reply Brief, Appellant Kenneth Davis (“Davis”) will directly
respond to certain matters raised in Appellee Dennis Goldsworthy’s (“Goldsworthy”)
Brief, including a portion in the “Statement of Facts” subsection and the “Argument”
section.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Conclude that Goldsworthy’s Neglect was Excusable
As an initial matter, Davis asserts that that Goldsworthy has mischaracterized the

conclusions of the trial court in summarizing the facts in his Brief of Appellee.
Specifically, in the “Statement of Facts” subsection of the “Statement of the Case”
portion of his Brief, Goldsworthy provides the following:
In considering whether to set aside the default for the second time, the court
concluded that while Mr. Goldsworthy was negligent in not responding to
discovery and appearing for depositions, and the reasons for that neglect
did not raise to the level of excusable neglect, that neglect did not prejudice
or harm Mr. Davis, outside of [the] extra [sic] attorney fees he incurred due
to Mr. Goldsworthy’s actions.
Brief of Appellee, p. 6 (emphasis added). As support for this statement, Goldsworthy
cites to page 496 of the Record—specifically, the “Analysis” portion of the trial court’s
Ruling. [See R. 496]. However, an examination of page 496 reveals that the trial court
in-fact did not find excusable neglect. On the contrary, the trial court expressly stated:
As far as rule 60(b) factors are concerned, the Court holds to its earlier
position that Mr. Goldsworthy’s conduct in failing to stay in touch with his
Utah counsel after his unexpected relocation to Colorado, and his failure to
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appear at deposition and to be responsive to discovery was neglect, and that
it was not excusable.
[R. 496] (emphasis added). Accordingly, this mischaracterization of the trial court’s
Ruling on the part of Goldsworthy should be noted by this Court.
B.

In Utah, the Standards to Set Aside an Entry of Default and a Default
Judgment Are Closely Related and Require the Trial Court to Make Findings
of Excusable Neglect and Thereafter to Determine if Meritorious Defense
Exists.
In his Brief, Goldsworthy places significant emphasis on the point that there is a

different standard for setting aside an entry of default as opposed to the setting aside of a
default judgment. Brief of Appellee, p. 10-13.
As stated by this Court in its previous Memorandum Decision, “… the standards
for setting aside a default may be less stringent than those for setting aside a default
judgment.” Davis v. Goldsworthy, 184 P.3d 626, 630 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) [R. 395]
(emphasis added). However, despite this statement, Goldsworthy asserts that “the Utah
Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear that there is a different standard for setting
aside an entry of default than there is for setting aside a default judgment.” Brief of
Appellee, p. 10 (citations omitted). As support for this proposition, Goldsworthy relies
upon a footnote in the Calder case decided in 1982 wherein the Utah Supreme Court
merely quotes the text of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Calder Bros. Co. v.
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1982). Notably, however, the Calder Court did not
elucidate any standard or test to set aside an entry of default under Rule 55. See Id.
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Conversely, in Davis’ Brief, Appellant recognized this Court’s previous notation
of a possible distinction between the entry of default and the entry of default judgment.
Brief of Appellant, p. 12. Davis also noted that this Court did not define a less stringent
standard other than to note the possible existence of such a distinction. Id. The point of
this recognition is to indentify and point out the robust debate about the possible
distinction.
Davis posits that a close relationship exists between Rules 55(c) and 60(b). Id. at
p. 13. This is self evident as both courts and litigants often look to the 60(b) factors when
faced with a Rule 55(c) “good cause” analysis. Id. This method and activity comports
with precedent set forth by this Court in the Miller opinion. Miller v. Brocksmith, 825
P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Specifically, Miller states, “the factors described in
Rule 60(b) are relevant to a determination of whether defendant has shown good cause”
under Rule 55(c). Id. (citations omitted).
Goldsworthy’s acknowledgement of the close relationship between these standards
in contrast to Miller is limited to whether the Rule 60(b) factors are relevant to the Rule
55(c) analysis. Such a limited view does not comport with the analysis utilized by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Miller. See Id. In Miller, it should be notes that the Court
addressed the analysis used to determine “good cause” under Rule 55(c) and declared,
“the factors to be considered include whether [defendant’s] failure constitutes excusable
neglect and whether [defendant] has presented a meritorious defense to the action.” Id.
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(citing, among other cases, State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983)). To
this point, Goldsworthy argues that since Miller cites Musselman as authority, a case that
specifically dealt with the Rule 60(b) factors in the context of setting aside a default
judgment—and “does not make a single reference to Rule 55(c)”—that Miller should not
be considered. Brief of Appellee, p. 12.
First, it is plainly evident that the Miller court used the Rule 60(b) factors to
analyze “good cause” under Rule 55(c) because the factors are relevant as discussed
herein. Furthermore, the cases Musselman cited and relied upon in support of this rule
dealt with both default judgments and entry of defaults, and notably, the courts applied
the same analysis. See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah
1976) (default judgment); Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322, 1323 (Utah 1979) (default
judgment); DeHoney v. Hernandez, 595 P.2d 159 (Ariz. 1979) (entry of default); White v.
Holm, 438 P.2d 581 (Wash.1968) (default judgment); and In re Arthur Treacher's
Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 398, 415 (E.D.Pa.1981) (entry of default). Other
jurisdictions have gone further in their analysis. In the Arizona case of DeHoney v.
Hernandez, the standard to set aside a default judgment coincides with the standard to set
aside an entry of default. DeHoney v. Hernandez, 595 P.2d 159, 163 (Ariz. 1979).
While the Court of Appeals in Miller may not have expressly explained how the
60(b) factors in Musselman apply to a “good cause” analysis, the Miller court clearly
adopted the standard elucidated in Musselman, and applied it to its Rule 55(c) analysis.
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This makes perfect logical sense, especially in light of the well-documented and widely
pervasive, close relationship between the two standards.
As discussed in Appellant’s Brief, and perhaps most importantly, the Court of
Appeals has set forth the policy that “the question of meritorious defense arises only if
excusable neglect had been shown.” Miller, 825 P.2d at 693 (citing Musselman, 667 P.2d
at 1056 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 (Utah 1963))). As
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Musselman, the trial court is required to “consider
and resolve the question of excusable neglect prior to its consideration of the issue of
whether a meritorious defense exists.” Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 (internal parentheses
omitted). “[I]n accordance with this policy, it is unnecessary, and moreover
inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious defenses unless the court is
satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, in
this State, in order to set aside an entry of default, the trial court must find “good cause.”
Such a finding requires the court to consider first whether evidence exists sufficient to
make a legal determination of excusable neglect, and second—meritorious defense. See
Miller, 825 P.2d 693; see also Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056.
Finally, Goldsworthy has implied that following the precedent set forth in Miller
will lead to an excessive limitation on a trial’s court’s discretion. Nothing could be
further from reality. As this point, the trial courts are left to guess at when level of interconnectivity exists between Rule 60(b) and Rule 55(c). In this Appeal, this Court will
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clarify this vaguery and allow trial courts the ability to analyze and exercise their
discretion within a known framework. Further, the structured analysis set forth in Miller
as a method and/or order to consider the Rule 60(b) factors provides some guidance to
the trial court in how they should reach a determination of good cause, as the trial court
was required to do in Miller. A contrary rule, as argued by Goldsworthy and “legal
scholars” that trial courts should consider attendant facts and circumstances, would allow
the trial court to continue to pick and choose at random among various factors and tests
without any continuity, creating an often unpredictable outcome.
C.

The Motion to Dismiss Should Not Bear on Whether a Default Judgment is
Proper, Since it Was Submitted After Mr. Goldsworthy’s Default was
Entered.
In Utah, only the well-pled factual allegations and valid legal bases of the non-

defaulting party are binding in supporting a default judgment. Skanchy v. Calcados
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). After a default judgment has been entered,
the defaulting party may appeal and contest the sufficiency of the complaint and the
allegations supporting the judgment. Id. While Goldsworthy asserts that Davis is barred
from seeking a default judgment because of the trial court granting the Motion to
Dismiss, the Motion was not properly presented until after an entry of default was
granted against Goldsworthy. Like the reasoning in Skanchy, only the facts alleged by
the non-defaulting party are binding on the determination of whether a default judgment
is proper. Thus, when this Court decides to uphold the entry of default, Goldsworthy’s
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subsequent pleadings will be irrelevant, and the matter should proceed as it was
scheduled to before Goldsworthy led the trial court into error—as if the entry of default
not been set aside. In addition, as in Skanchy, the proper time for Goldsworthy to address
the sufficiency of the pleadings would be in an appeal if a default judgment is then
granted. Therefore, because Goldsworthy’s Motion to Dismiss was submitted after his
default was entered, the trial court is only permitted to consider the facts as plead in
Davis’ Complaint.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should once again reverse the trial court’s
ruling setting aside the entry of default, enter default against Goldsworthy, and remand
the matter to the trial court with instruction to hold a hearing on general damages while
simultaneously quieting title to the real property in the Appellant.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 2009.

HEIDEMAN, MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C.

BRADLEY J. WEBER,
Attorney for Appellant Kenneth Davis
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